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D I A L O G U E

Determining Climate
Responsibility: Government
Liability for Hurricane Katrina?
Summary
In St. Bernard Parish Government v. United States,
Louisiana property owners argued that the U.S. government was liable under takings law for flood damage to their properties caused by Hurricane Katrina
and other hurricanes. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit disagreed, however, noting that
the government cannot be liable on a takings theory
for inaction, and that the government action was not
shown to have been the cause of the flooding. On
September 6, 2018, the Environmental Law Institute
hosted an expert panel to explore this ruling and its
potential implications for future litigation in a world
of changing climate, extreme weather, and uncertain
liability. Below, we present a transcript of the discussion, which has been edited for style, clarity, and
space considerations.
Teresa Chan (moderator) is a former Senior Attorney at
the Environmental Law Institute.
Michael Burger is Executive Director of the Sabin Center
for Climate Change Law at Columbia Law School.
Vincent Colatriano is a Partner at Cooper & Kirk, PLLC.
John Echeverria is a Professor of Law at the Vermont
Law School.
Teresa Chan: Thank you for joining us as we discuss government liability for Hurricane Katrina. We are going to
focus on the St. Bernard Parish Government v. United States
case.1 To provide some background, this case was started
in 2005 in the Court of Federal Claims. As the appellate
court noted, the plaintiffs are Louisiana property owners
who argued that the federal government was liable for flood
damage to their properties caused by Hurricane Katrina
and other hurricanes as a taking. The lower court agreed
Editor’s Note: Mr. Colatriano is one of the attorneys representing
the property owner plaintiffs in the St. Bernard Parish
Government litigation.
1.

St. Bernard Parish Government v. United States, 887 F.3d 1354, No. 20162301, 2016-2373, 48 ELR 20065 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 20, 2018).
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with the plaintiffs, but on appeal earlier this year, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that decision.
We want to focus on this case for a few different reasons.
One, it certainly adds to the body of cases on takings law
and, as our panelists will dig into the details, perhaps clarifies some issues on that front. Also, we want to focus on
this case because of its potential implications for future litigation of this type. As we start to see more extreme weather
and more disasters, we expect that we might see an increase
in these sorts of cases.
To help me navigate through this case as well as
the potential implications, I have a wonderful panel of
experts. We have Vincent Colatriano, who has represented
the plaintiffs in this case, and we have John Echeverria, a
professor at Vermont Law School, and Michael Burger,
who is at the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law. With
that, I’m going to turn things over to our first speaker,
Vincent, who is a partner at Cooper & Kirk. As I mentioned, he’s also counsel for the plaintiffs in this case and
he’s going to tell us about the background for this case as
well as the decision.
Vincent Colatriano: I’m delighted to have the opportunity
to talk about this case and to contribute to this discussion.
I can’t and won’t claim to be a completely neutral observer
or analyst because, as Teresa mentioned, I’ve been litigating
this case. I’ve been part of a team that has litigated the case
for more than a decade along with some other attorneys at
my law firm, including Chuck Cooper, as well as a great
team of lawyers who are based in both Washington, D.C.,
and Louisiana.
Because of that and because it is an ongoing case, I
believe my best role here is not to provide extensive commentary on the case, but rather to provide some background about the case and about the decisions. I think that
I could provide a useful summary that will contribute to
the wider discussion that the other panelists will be focusing on.
Let me begin by saying that from my admittedly narrow
perspective, I think the title of this program is probably not
entirely accurate. Our case is not, strictly speaking, about
the government’s liability for Hurricane Katrina. We aren’t
seeking to hold the government responsible for the storm
in some general sense or even for most of the flooding associated with the storm.
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The case is rather about the government’s responsibility
for some of the flooding, in a confined geographic area,
that was associated with Hurricane Katrina. It was flooding that was stemming, in our view, from a discrete federal
government project called the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, or, as I’ve been referring to it for 10 years, the MRGO.
As I’m sure everybody knows, huge swaths of the city of
New Orleans and the Greater New Orleans metropolitan
area flooded during Hurricane Katrina. Our case is about
one relatively small subset of that metro area: an area called
St. Bernard Parish, which is outside New Orleans, and
the Lower Ninth Ward—a community or neighborhood
within New Orleans. The image in Figure 1 shows a closeup on the right of St. Bernard Parish and the Lower Ninth
Ward.2 In the upper right-hand corner is Lake Borgne, and
next to Lake Borgne—which is really a part of the Gulf
of Mexico rather than an actual lake—is what looks like
a river or a canal. That’s the MRGO, which was a canal
dug by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps), as a
federal navigation project in the 1960s.
Figure 1.

On the left side of the Lower Ninth Ward is the Port of
New Orleans. The MRGO was a way for shipping to have
a more direct route to the Port of New Orleans from the
Gulf of Mexico. Prior to the construction of the MRGO,
deep-draft shipping had to come up the Mississippi River,
which meanders—it takes a while to get from the Gulf to
the Port of New Orleans by using the Mississippi River. So,
the MRGO was a navigation channel that was intended to
provide a shortcut for that shipping.
It was authorized by the U.S. Congress in 1956. It was
built during the 1960s and substantially completed by
1968 or so. It’s about 76 miles long. It was authorized to
be about 500 to 650 feet wide in most places. It has two
main “reaches” or segments. The segment that goes along
Lake Borgne is known as Reach 2. That then links up with
a portion of the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway, called Reach
2.

St. Bernard Parish Gov’t v. United States, Nos. 16-2301, 16-2373 (Fed. Cir.
Mar. 24, 2017).
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1. That links up with what’s known as the Inner Harbor
Navigation Canal or the Industrial Canal, which was a
canal built between Lake Pontchartrain and the Mississippi River, and that’s where the Port of New Orleans is.
To keep the MRGO operational, it had to be dredged
periodically by the Corps to ensure that it had the right
depth for shipping. The MRGO was ultimately closed to
deep-draft shipping in 2009. It was “closed” in the sense
that there was a rock barrier constructed at one location on
the MRGO channel to block shipping from coming up the
MRGO and reaching the Port of New Orleans that way.
This was a controversial project from the start because of
its anticipated environmental effects. Because it was carving a channel through wetlands to the Gulf of Mexico,
there was going to be a lot of salt water that would intrude
into these wetlands. And salt water destroys certain types
of wetlands. Prior to the MRGO, this area had a lot of
cypress and tupelo forests and other types of wetlands.
The MRGO destroyed a lot of those wetlands. It converted
some of those forests into different types of wetlands, more
marshy types of wetlands, and it converted other wetlands
to open water. That’s important because wetlands retard
hurricane surges. They buffer against hurricane surges. So,
when you destroy wetlands, you are destroying a natural
barrier to hurricanes.
The other thing that was anticipated at the time was that
because of ship wakes from ships using this channel and
because of maintenance dredging, the channel banks were
going to widen. They were going to erode. That was fully
anticipated, and over time, that expansion was quite severe
in some places, so that the MRGO expanded up to 3,000
feet from its authorized width of 500 feet. In most areas it
at least tripled to 1,700 or 1,800 feet in width.
And that channel widening would lead to a number of
other impacts. For example, the erosion created a greatly
increased “fetch” or expanse of water that allows waves to
generate and strengthen during storms. It was also anticipated that the MRGO would create a hydraulic connection basically to downtown New Orleans and the Lower
Ninth Ward and St. Bernard Parish, by increasing the connectivity between those areas and other waterways and the
Gulf. That was another anticipated effect of the MRGO.
In addition, the expansion of the channel destroyed what
was known as the land bridge between the banks of the
MRGO and Lake Borgne. This exposed areas south of the
channel directly to Lake Borgne and the Gulf. Those were
some of the effects of the MRGO.
The other thing that was going on was that the Corps
and other government agencies were warned about the risks
that were posed by the MRGO, and specifically risks relating to flooding. As early as 1957, the Corps was warned that
during times of hurricanes, the MRGO would be a danger
to heavily populated areas by increasing the connectivity of
water, and would allow surges to reach the protected areas
much more quickly and much more destructively.
The Corps understood at the time it was designed that
erosion of the MRGO’s banks would occur due to wave

Copyright © 2019 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
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wash unless the banks of the MRGO were armored using
rocks or some other form of armoring. But the Corps
decided as a policy matter not to do that. It understood
that erosion would occur, but it didn’t armor the banks for
its own policy reasons.
By the 1980s, the Corps was acknowledging in internal studies that the erosion had led to an expansion in the
width of the MRGO, that the Lake Borgne land bridge
had been destroyed, and that once that was broken, development to the southwest—which was St. Bernard Parish
basically—would be exposed to hurricane attacks from
Lake Borgne. So, the Corps, the government, was aware of
or was warned about some of these risks.
There’s another federal project that is relevant to this
case, and that’s the flood protection system that was in
place at the time of Hurricane Katrina. That was known as
the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity (LPV) flood protection system. To understand this case, you need to know a
little bit about the LPV as well as the MRGO.
Congress passed legislation in the 1940s and 1950s
authorizing the Corps to study various flood protection
schemes for this area. In 1965, Congress authorized the
construction of the LPV. The LPV was basically a system of
levees and floodwalls that protected the entire Greater New
Orleans area. In Figure 2, the white lines depict some of
those levees and floodwalls.3 The levees by the Mississippi
River were part of a separate project. They preexisted the
LPV, but pretty much all of the other levees and floodwalls
were built as part of the LPV. These levees and floodwalls
were built during the 1970s basically and, as you can see,
the LPV protected the entire area, not just St. Bernard Parish and the Lower Ninth Ward.
Figure 2.
Greater New Orleans
Flood Protection System

49 ELR 10007

tence. There was also a state levee known as the 40 Arpent
that was built earlier. The 40 Arpent levee was not a federal
project. It was a state project that was left in place after the
LPV was built. So, that’s the flood protection system.
Figure 3.

For our purposes, it’s important to understand that the
MRGO and LPV were separate and independent projects.
The MRGO is a navigation project. The LPV was not. It
was a flood control project. They were authorized separately by Congress. They were funded differently. They
were authorized and built at different times, although some
of those times overlapped. They have different geographical footprints. The LPV actually protected a lot more than
the area around the MRGO.
So, that brings us to Hurricane Katrina, which made
landfall in late August 2005 as a Category 3 storm. The eye
of the storm passed right over Lake Borgne and it pushed a
huge storm surge and destructive waves directly at St. Bernard Parish as the storm passed over. Those waves strengthened considerably as they built up over the increased “fetch”
of the expanded MRGO channel. This led to the breaching
of the LPV levees that were along the MRGO. Almost all
of the water that flooded St. Bernard Parish came through
levee breaches along the MRGO.
Figure 4.

Figure 3 shows some of the LPV protections in the area
that are relevant to this lawsuit.4 There was a levee built
near the MRGO protecting the area from Lake Borgne.
There was a Mississippi River levee that was already in exis3.
4.

St. Bernard Parish Gov’t v. United States, No. 18-359 (U.S. Sept. 17, 2018).
St. Bernard Parish Gov’t v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 687, 704, 45 ELR
20084 (Fed. Cl. 2015).
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Figure 4 depicts some of those levee breaches.5 The white
lines show where the breaches were in the levees along the
MRGO. As you can see, the levees breached primarily
along the MRGO and did not really breach significantly
elsewhere. So, the levees breached early during the storm.
The waters cascading through those breaches flowed into
an area of wetlands called the Central Wetlands Unit. They
filled up the Central Wetlands Unit to the point where
they then overtopped the 40 Arpent levee and flooded all
the developed areas of St. Bernard Parish and the Lower
Ninth Ward. That led, as you can imagine, to some pretty
extensive, and catastrophic, flooding.
The case is primarily about the flooding during Katrina,
but there’s also an element of flooding in areas outside the
LPV that happened during other storms. Even when there
wasn’t a severe storm, some areas outside the LPV would
flood periodically. But this case focuses primarily on the
flooding during Hurricane Katrina.
As you can imagine, that flooding led to a lot of litigation over the responsibility for the destruction it caused.
For our purposes, there are two main groups of cases that
dealt with the flooding associated with or caused by the
MRGO. One, the Robinson case, was a tort case.6 Our firm
was not involved in that litigation. It was tried by a very
capable group of lawyers based primarily in Louisiana.
That case was brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act,7
and claimed that the Corps was negligent in how it maintained and operated the MRGO, and that negligence led
to the flooding.
There were a series of decisions in that case. There was
a summary judgment decision in which the district court
rejected the government’s argument that the Corps was
immunized under the Flood Control Act8 for the flood
damage because the flooding stemmed from a flood control project. The district court said no, the MRGO and
the LPV were separate projects, and the Corps’ MRGOrelated activities were not flood control activities. Thus,
the Corps was not entitled to immunity under the Flood
Control Act.9
That then led to a 19-day bench trial that featured
extensive expert testimony and computer modeling. At the
end of that trial, the district court issued a decision finding the government liable for how it operated the MRGO,
and finding that but for the MRGO as it existed in 2005,
the LPV levees would not have breached, and much of the
flooding would not have occurred.10
That decision was appealed by the Government, and
there were two decisions by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit panel in that appeal. The first panel deci5.

St. Bernard Parish Gov’t v. United States, No. 05-cv-1119 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 12,
2013), Doc. 240.
6. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 696 F.3d 436, 42 ELR 20197 (5th
Cir. 2012).
7. 28 U.S.C. ch. 171.
8. 33 U.S.C. ch. 15.
9. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 577 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D. La.
2008).
10. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 647 F. Supp. 2d 644 (E.D. La.
2009).
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sion affirmed the trial court’s liability decision that rejected
the government’s claim for immunity under either the
Flood Control Act or the Federal Tort Claims Act’s discretionary function exemption.11
The government then petitioned for rehearing, and
the same panel issued a new decision in which it reversed
course. Significantly, the second panel decision did not dispute the trial court’s factual rulings about the MRGO’s
causal role in the flooding, and it agreed that the government was not immune under the Flood Control Act for
this flooding. But the panel did rule that the government
was entitled to immunity under the discretionary function
exemption of the Federal Tort Claims Act. So, even though
the panel accepted the findings about the MRGO’s role in
the flooding, it said the government was immunized from
tort liability. That decision pretty much ended the tort litigation, but there was still the separate takings litigation
that brings us here today.
I know some of the other panelists will go over takings
law generally, but let me give you some very basic principles. The Fifth Amendment says that private property
should not be taken for public use without just compensation. Physical invasions of property have been held to
amount to takings for which the government can owe just
compensation. There has been a series of decisions by the
U.S. Supreme Court in which the government has been
held liable when it floods property.12
Most of these cases have to do with federal dam projects that led either to permanent flooding or to recurring
flooding in various contexts. But the Court has on numerous occasions held the government liable for taking when
it floods land. The most recent decision that I’ll summarize was the Arkansas Game & Fish Commission decision
from 2012.13 There, the Court rejected an argument that
the government can never be liable when it floods property
temporarily; the government argued that it can only be
liable for a taking when flooding is permanent. The Court
ruled that such blanket exceptions from takings liability
are disfavored. It stressed that most takings claims have to
be assessed on a situation-by-situation basis, and there’s no
categorical immunity from liability for temporary flooding.
The Court laid out a series of non-exhaustive factors
that the courts were to look at in determining whether
temporary flooding amounted to a taking. Those factors
included the duration of the flooding, the severity of the
flooding, the degree to which the flooding was intended
or was the foreseeable result of government actions, and
things like that. That’s the basic background on takings
law as it relates to flooding.
So, the MRGO case was filed in 2005 in the Court of
Federal Claims. That’s the court that hears most takings
11. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 673 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2012).
12. See, e.g., Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166 (1872); United States v.
Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917);
United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947); United States v. Kansas
City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950).
13. Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 42
ELR 20247 (2012).

Copyright © 2019 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.

1-2019

NEWS & ANALYSIS

claims against the U.S. government. The main plaintiffs
include owners of residential, commercial, industrial, and
municipal properties in this area, and it was filed as a class
action. There were two trials held. One was in late 2011
focusing on liability.14 The second was in 2013 focusing on
just compensation/damages.15 In the liability decision from
2015, the Court of Federal Claims applied the Arkansas
Game factors in an exhaustive analysis and issued a lengthy
decision concluding that the government was liable for a
temporary taking.
The court found that it was foreseeable to the Corps
that the construction, operation, and failure to maintain
the MRGO would substantially increase storm surge and
waves and cause flooding. It then engaged in a lengthy
analysis of causation and concluded that, yes, it was the
MRGO that led to increased storm surge and increased
destructive waves. That set a chain of events into motion
that exposed the LPV levees to waves and surge that they
wouldn’t have otherwise been exposed to, and led to the
breaching of the levees and then the catastrophic flooding
of St. Bernard Parish and the Lower Ninth Ward.
So, the MRGO caused the breaching of the levees,
which led to the flooding of St. Bernard Parish and the
Lower Ninth. The court also found that the flooding was
severe, as can hardly be denied, and that this amounted to
a temporary taking that lasted from the day before Katrina
made landfall until July 2009, which was when the MRGO
was closed to deep-draft shipping.
As noted, there was later a damages and class certification decision by the Court of Federal Claims. The court
basically awarded damages for the loss of improvements,
the damages to improvements, and the rental value for
some of the land that was subjected to flooding, and then
certified the class.
The government appealed, raising a number of issues,
and earlier this year, a panel of the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit reversed. The panel didn’t reach a lot of
the issues raised by the government, and it didn’t really disturb any of the court’s factual findings. Instead, the panel
announced two legal rulings.
The first was that it pivoted off of the Court of Federal
Claims’ observation that the Corps had failed to maintain the MRGO in such a way as to mitigate the flood
risk that it had created. The panel ruled that that observation amounted to a claim premised on government
“inaction,” and it held that the government can never be
liable under the Takings Clause for a failure to act, but
only for affirmative acts. So, according to the panel, the
theory that the government failed to maintain or modify
this project to avoid or mitigate the flood risk created by
the project does not support the takings claim. That was
holding number one.

14. St. Bernard Parish Government v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 687, 45 ELR
20084 (2015).
15. St. Bernard Parish Government v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 707, 46 ELR
20087 (2016).
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The second holding had to do with causation. Here, the
court basically said that in the causation analysis, it wasn’t
enough to show that the MRGO led to the breaching of
the LPV levees and that those breaches led to flooding.
The court said we needed to show instead whether flooding would have occurred if the levees had never been built,
because the levees were also a government project. And the
panel basically said we needed to remove all effects of all
government actions that are related to flood risk, regardless
of whether those actions were independent from, or would
have taken place even in the absence of, the action we were
challenging, in this case the MRGO project. Because,
according to the panel, we could not show that the flooding would not have occurred in the absence of both the
MRGO and the LPV, we could not establish a taking.
Those are the basic holdings of the case. The case is still
ongoing, as a cert petition was filed and remains pending.16
Teresa Chan: We’re going to turn now to our second panelist, John Echeverria. John is a professor of law at Vermont
Law School, where he teaches property law, public law, and
a wide range of environmental and natural resources law
courses. He’s also an expert on takings and has a takings
litigation blog. John is going to talk about some of the takings issues here.
John Echeverria: I’m going to cover some of the same
ground that Vince covered, but from a slightly different perspective. I’m going to talk about the basic rules
governing flooding takings cases. I want to focus first on
Arkansas Game & Fish Commission, and then I’ll turn to
St. Bernard Parish.
It’s important to start with the Arkansas Game & Fish
Commission case because prior to that decision the United
States had taken the position, and that position had been
upheld on numerous occasions by the Federal Circuit, that
government-induced flooding will provide a basis for takings liability only if it’s a permanent flooding. There were
some venerable Supreme Court decisions that seemed to
strongly support that position and the Federal Circuit had
embraced those decisions.
So, a case such as St. Bernard Parish, based on a temporary flooding theory, would have been dead in the water
in the Federal Circuit prior to the Arkansas Game & Fish
Commission decision. The Arkansas Game & Fish Commission decision changed everything. It said that just as you
can bring a takings claim based on a regulatory restriction that is temporary in nature—not likely to be a winning claim but a permissible claim—so, too, in the case of
flooding, one can bring a takings claim based on temporary inundation.
Another important issue in flooding taking cases relates
to the foreseeability of harm. This issue was addressed by
Judge Susan Braden. It was not addressed by the court of
appeals in the St. Bernard Parish case. The appeals court
said there was a substantial issue about whether or not the
16. St. Bernard Parish Gov’t v. United States, No. 18-359 (U.S. Sept. 17, 2018).
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requirement of foreseeability of harm had been met, but
did not attempt to resolve the issue.
There is also the question on when a government-caused
inundation represents a taking versus a tort. Self-evidently,
the convoluted history of litigation arising from Hurricane
Katrina illustrates the difficulty that even experienced
lawyers can have in trying to figure out whether a legal
challenge is best mounted under a tort theory or under a
takings theory. Obviously, an effort was made to mount a
tort suit and that failed based on the discretionary function
exception after many, many years of litigation. One of the
conclusions in the current takings litigation is that there
is no taking here, but there might have been a tort. But if
there was a tort, the tort claim is defeated by the immunity
defense that blocked the first round of litigation.
And then there is the question of to what extent takings
claims arising from inundation need to be based on affirmative government action, or whether they can be based
on government inaction.
To begin at the beginning, the Supreme Court has long
recognized that government-caused permanent inundations of private property likely constitute takings on a socalled per se basis, as in the granddaddy case Pumpelly v.
Green Bay Co.17 from the late 19th century. The rule that
permanent inundations of private property represent per
se takings is consistent with the general rule that permanent occupations of property of whatever sort are subject
to a per se rule. The leading permanent occupation case is
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.18
What the per se test apparently means is that even if
only a small portion of a property is inundated, takings
liability will result. And even if there’s no showing of any
significant economic harm, takings liability will also be
recognized. A primary defense that is available, at least
in some cases, is that, based on applicable background
principles of state or federal law, the property owner has
no property entitlement to claim a right to be free from
inundation. For example, if the government is exercising
its federal navigational servitude and flooding results, there
would be no basis for a takings claim.
The question presented in Arkansas Game & Fish was
whether a taking may occur within the meaning of the
Takings Clause when a government-induced flood invasion, although repetitive, was merely temporary. The
Supreme Court in a unanimous decision ruled that yes, a
takings claim can potentially succeed in that circumstance,
that is, when inundation is only temporary.
The Arkansas Game & Fish case involved flooding
damage to the Dave Donaldson Wildlife Management
Area in Arkansas along the Black River. This is a wildlife
management area that borders a river and is frequently
flooded. There is duck hunting. There is a lot of game
hunting. And most importantly for present purposes,
there’s a substantial timber resource that prior to the
events leading to this litigation was periodically flooded
17. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
18. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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from time to time over the course of the year, but in a way
that did not interfere with timber growth.
But about 100 miles upstream from the wildlife management area is the Clearwater Dam operated by the
Corps. It’s really quite an enormous distance along the
Black River from the dam up in Missouri to the wildlife
management down in Arkansas.
In 1993, the Corps, which of course had a water control
manual governing the operations of the dam, adopted an
amendment to its water control manual. This amendment
was in response to a request made by local farmers, who
wished to see slower releases from the dam from September to November that would allow them more time to go
into their flood-prone fields adjacent to the river and harvest their crops. To accommodate that constituent request,
the Corps agreed to modify the schedule of releases from
the dam.
But there’s a fixed quantity of water coming down the
river and behind the dam, of course. So the slower releases
from the dam to benefit the farmers, done in the fall,
meant a larger release had to be made from the dam in
the spring and the summer to compensate. Those larger
releases led to more flooding of the wildlife management
area in that period.
Probably because it was so far downstream, the Corps
wasn’t very alert to what was going on. The wildlife management area managers objected that too much water was
coming downstream, and eventually brought the takings
lawsuit and established in the trial court that the increased
water releases in the spring and summer had led to substantial damage to the timber resources of the wildlife management area. The trial court upheld the takings claim.
The Federal Circuit, applying its long-standing rule that
only a permanent inundation can give rise to takings liability, reversed, saying that compensation may be sought only
when flooding is permanent or inevitably recurring. So, if
it’s inherently temporary, as the flooding was in this case
because it only lasted about five years, no liability would
lie. The Federal Circuit relied heavily on the Supreme
Court’s 1924 decision in Sanguinetti.19 But the Supreme
Court reversed, holding that even a temporary inundation
may amount to a taking.
One of the interesting things about this decision in
terms of larger doctrinal developments is that the Supreme
Court, although it had insisted for many years that a claim
of permanent inundation should be governed by a per se
test, rejected the argument that a per se test should apply in
the case of a temporary inundation. Instead, the Court said
that a multifactor takings analysis should apply involving a
variety of factors including the duration of the temporary
government-caused inundation, the degree to which invasion was intended or was the foreseeable result of authorized government action, the character of the land at issue,
the owner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations
regarding the land’s use, and the severity of the interference caused by the inundation.
19. Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146 (1924).
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These factors are not completely unlike the factors the
Court considers in the traditional multifactor analysis it
uses in partial or regulatory takings cases based on the
Penn Central20 precedent. That analysis consists of three
issues: economic impact, degree of interference with investment-backed expectations, and the character of the governmental action. But for whatever reason, even though in the
Arkansas Game & Fish Commission decision the Supreme
Court rejected the notion that a per se analysis should
apply, it didn’t simply apply the traditional Penn Central
analysis. It developed a brand new, distinctive multifactor
analysis for application to flooding cases.
Importantly, in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission, the
Supreme Court was very careful to emphasize that it was
not authorizing a takings recovery for flooding damages
that would have been even greater if the dam had never been
built at all. The Court said the plaintiff’s land had not been
exposed to flooding comparable to the 1990s inundation,
the inundation that gave rise to this lawsuit, at any other
time either prior to or after the construction of the dam.
In effect, the Court said that you cannot claim a taking
if construction of the dam reduced flooding risk and then
a particular operating plan was put in place and then there
was a change in the operating plan that caused some new
flooding risk, if at the end of the day the landowner was
still better off because the dam had been built in the first
place. If a landowner plaintiff is not getting the full suite of
flood control benefits originally received, but there is still at
least some net flood control benefits, the Court said there
would not be a taking in that situation.
On remand, the Federal Circuit, in accordance with
the reasoning of the Supreme Court, said the proper comparison for the purpose of takings analysis is between the
flooding that occurred prior to the construction of the dam
and the flooding that occurred during the deviation from
the original operating plan—not between the flooding
that occurred prior to the adoption of the deviation and
after the adoption of the deviation.
One of the interesting issues that was left on the table
in Arkansas Game & Fish was the role of state water law
in analyzing these kinds of claims. One of the important
features of the reasonable use riparian doctrine that’s applicable in Arkansas and in many U.S. states is that no one
owning land along a river can claim an entitlement to any
fixed quantity of water flowing down the river. A river is
inherently variable and the amount of water will change
naturally. In addition, each person operating along a river
has a right to make a reasonable use of the water and is permitted to alter its quality and quantity to some degree in
exercising their own property rights. Therefore, no downstream riparian party, including the Arkansas Game and
Fish Commission, has a right to assume that they are going
to get exactly the level of water they have been expecting
to receive.
20. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 8 ELR
20528 (1978).
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So at the Supreme Court level, a group of academics
tossed in an amicus brief that said, in effect, the whole case
has been litigated on a false premise—that is, that the character of the underlying state water rights don’t matter. Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg writing for the Court said, well, this
is a very interesting argument, but nobody raised it below,
so it’s too late for us to consider it in this case. But she did
recognize the significance of the issue that was raised.
I think going forward, in thinking about flooding
cases, it’s important not simply to take the takings ruling offered by Arkansas Game & Fish and by St. Bernard
Parish and other decisions, but to recognize that there are
important questions having to do with the nature of the
entitlement to use water and what limitations are attached
to that right. Whenever a landowner claims flooding
damage consistent with the limitations that are built into
his or her water right to begin with, there’ll be no basis for
takings liability.
This leads us to the St. Bernard Parish case. This map in
Figure 5 shows the MRGO shortly after it was excavated
and before the channel was expanded through a process
of erosion.
Figure 5.
Lake
Pontchartrain

Lake Borgne

Source: Lake Pontchartrain Basin Foundation.

The plaintiff’s theory of liability was that the government was liable under the Takings Clause, first, because
of government inaction including the failure to properly
maintain or modify the channel as time went on, and second, based on government action, the construction and
operation of the MRGO channel. So, there are two distinct theories of liability at issue in the case.
With respect to the claim based on inaction, the Federal
Circuit ruled that the claim failed as a matter of law. A
property loss compensable as a taking only results when
the asserted invasion is a direct natural or probable result
of an authorized government action. Inaction cannot lead
to a taking. At the same time, the court said inaction might
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conceivably be the basis for a viable tort claim if it weren’t
barred by an immunity doctrine. But the court’s square
ruling on inaction in the context of a takings case knocked
out half the case.
Generally speaking, I think it’s fair to say that the
Federal Circuit ruling on this issue is consistent with the
weight of authority. A number of courts, mostly at the
state level but around the country, have from time to time
addressed this issue. These largely consistent rulings, with
some modest exceptions, conclude that inaction is not a
basis for takings liability.
The rationale for this conclusion has never been elaborated on in any great detail, as far as I am aware. But let
me offer what I think are the best arguments for it. One is
that from the time the Takings Clause was drafted and litigated up to modern times, takings cases have consistently
arisen from affirmative governmental actions. All the takings cases you can think of and that you have read over the
years involved the government doing something, and to
expand takings liability to a whole new universe of government inaction would be, at least in historical terms, a major
expansion of the doctrine.
The second reason has to do with the effect of takings
liability on the ability of government to operate. Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, when he famously applied the
Takings Clause to regulation in a meaningful way for the
first time in the Mahon21 decision, cautioned that government could hardly go on if every time it acted it were liable
under the Takings Clause. Takings liability, if taken too
far, would be a major impediment to the implementation
of legislative policy decisions as well as executive policy
decisions. Expanding liability under the Takings Clause to
the realm of inaction would seriously undermine the ability of government to function.
I think, finally, there’s the concern that subjecting
government to liability based on inaction really opens up
takings litigation to an unlimited set of actions. The set
of actions the government takes represent an identifiable
universe of actions. The actions that government hasn’t
taken are really limitless. Only the limitations of the
imagination of a plaintiff’s lawyer to dream of something
that the government should have done and might have
done, would provide the outer limits on this expansive
version of takings doctrine.
So, for all those reasons, I think this is a well-founded
legal rule and I would doubt very much that the Supreme
Court wants to take this issue up. I’d be curious to see
whether the cert petition tries to bring this issue before the
Supreme Court.
With respect to claims based on the actions of building and operating the MRGO, the Federal Circuit said the
takings claim failed because the plaintiffs failed to establish
that these actions caused the asserted property damage. As
I explained earlier, in Arkansas Game & Fish, the plaintiffs
were under an obligation to show that the damage would
not have occurred in the absence of the governmental
21. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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action in order to show causation. For the purpose of causation analysis, the Federal Circuit ruled that the relevant
government action included not only the MRGO project,
but also the actions taken by the government to mitigate
the impact of the MRGO, specifically the construction of
the levee system protecting the parish and New Orleans
against hurricane damage.
Basically, the Federal Circuit faulted the Court of
Claims for focusing on the MRGO and not taking the
levee system into account. The court struggled to some
degree in trying to define the relevant governmental action
and how to define the scope of the governmental action or
the bits and pieces of governmental action that need to be
taken and considered together for the purposes of assessing
takings liability. The court said, “When the government
takes actions that are directly related to preventing the
same type of injury on the same property where the damage occurred, such action must be taken into account even
if the two actions are not the result of the ‘same project.’”22
It seems to me this ruling is both fair and just, while
obviously there may be limits to how frequently givings or
mitigation measures can or should be taken into account. In
this instance, it seems to me that the levees were so directly
related to the flood risk associated with the construction of
MRGO they should have been taken into account.
What the court seems to be saying is that, although the
plaintiffs didn’t present any direct evidence on this, if all
the levees had fully counteracted the risk created by the
MRGO, then as far as the evidence on record would show,
the logical conclusion would have been that the damage
was caused by the monster storm and not by any governmental action.
Teresa Chan: We’re going to turn to our final speaker,
Michael Burger. He is the executive director of the Sabin
Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia Law School,
where he oversees a team of attorneys working to combat
climate change. His own research and advocacy focus on
the legal strategies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, as
well as to promote climate change adaptation. Michael is
going to expand our discussion and talk about this case in
the context of climate change litigation generally.
Michael Burger: Vince and John have already provided
an extensive treatment of the particulars of the St. Bernard
Parish litigation, of the takings analysis, and of the potential role that the case will play in defining takings jurisprudence moving forward. What I hope to do is broaden the
lens and look at the case in the context of climate change
litigation—in particular, the mode of litigation that seeks
to use the courts to force government adaptation to climate
change risks and impacts, either through seeking compensation or requiring adaptive action.
Climate change poses a wide range of risks to essentially all of our critical infrastructure. On the energy front,
22. St. Bernard Parish Government v. United States, 887 F.3d 1354, 1366, 48
ELR 20065 (Fed Cir. 2018).
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dams, power plants, the electric grid, fossil fuel exploration and production, facilities and operations, pipelines,
railways, bioenergy supplies, and energy demand are all
exposed to increasing temperatures, increasing precipitation, increasingly intense and frequent extreme weather
events, declining water availability, wildfire, sea-level rise,
and storm surge.
Wastewater treatment plants in coastal states across the
country are exposed to sea-level rise-induced flooding subjecting millions of residents and the nation’s coastal waterways to increasing risks of overflows and contamination.
Communities and individual properties are also exposed to
increasing risks associated with sea-level rise. Climate Central has developed a tool23 that allows people to downscale
projections to see how sea-level rise will impact individual
neighborhoods under a range of global warming scenarios.
This is one of a number of such tools, but it’s the one I like
to use when I’m playing around online and imagining dire
futures for me, my children, their children, and so on.
Of course sea-level rise is not the only source of flood
risk associated with climate change. Increasing incidents
in intensity of extreme precipitation events exposes people
in floodplains both along the coast and inland to floodrelated damages, including the temporary and potentially
even permanent loss of property.
Figure 6 illustrates a recent study that shows higher
numbers of people currently exposed to flood risk than
provided in most estimates and the increasing numbers of
people who will be exposed to flood risk by mid-century—
that’s 2100—under a couple different scenarios.24 The
study also shows the dollars associated with property damage in different zones—one in 50-year, one in 100-year,
and one in 500-year floodplains. Almost $2 trillion worth
of property is presently exposed to flooding in the one in
500-year floodplain, according to these estimates. Looking
out to 2100, this study estimates almost $5 trillion in property would be at risk. Again, this is just one study. There
are any number of analyses one could look to for a closer
look at the economic risks to property, infrastructure, and
economic sectors. A couple that I might refer you to would
be the Risky Business report and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s Climate Change Impacts and Risk
Analysis from 2015.25

23. Surging Seas, Climate Central, http://sealevel.climatecentral.org/ (last
visited Nov. 20, 2018).
24. Oliver E.J. Wing et al., Estimates of Present and Future Flood Risk in the
Conterminous United States, 13(3) Envtl. Res. Letters, 034023 (2018).
25. Risky Business, The Economic Risks of Climate Changes in the
United States (2014), available at https://riskybusiness.org/site/assets/
uploads/2015/09/RiskyBusiness_Report_WEB_09_08_14.pdf; U.S. EPA,
Climate Change in the United States: Benefits of Global Action
(2015), available at https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-06/
documents/cirareport.pdf.
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Given the extraordinary risks that climate change presents to the nation and its residents, one question that naturally arises in our litigious society is whether the courts
provide an avenue to force action that will either compensate those harmed by climate impacts, or force action to
reduce the risks from them. One approach to such litigation
would and does focus on private actors. One can look to
the recent lawsuits filed by 13 state and local governments
against fossil fuel companies seeking compensation for the
costs of adaptation under a variety of state common-law,
public trust, and statutory theories as an example of that
kind of litigation-based approach.26
But takings claims are filed against the government. So
my focus here will remain primarily on the claims that
might be made against governments either for the failure
to take action that adapts to climate change, or else for
taking actions that increase the harms associated with
climate change impacts. In analyses that are more fully
spelled out in our book chapter and article,27 the staff at the
Sabin Center have looked at potential claims for failure to
adapt based on three primary theories: negligence, fraud,
and takings.
In short, negligence and fraud face a preliminary obstacle in sovereign immunity. In negligence cases where sovereign immunity does not bar a claim, proving duty, breach,
harm, and causation will be difficult if not impossible in
some cases. In fraud cases where sovereign immunity does
not bar a claim, proving a knowing misrepresentation, the
26. Climate Change Litigation Databases, Sabin Center for Climate
Change Law, http://climatecasechart.com/case-category/common-lawclaims/ (last visited on Dec. 10, 2018).
27. Jennifer Klein, Potential Liability of Governments for Failure to Prepare for
Climate Change, Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, Columbia Law
School (2015), available at http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/files/2016/06/
Klein-2015-08-Liability-US-Gov-Failure-to-Prep-Climate-Change.pdf.
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intent to have others rely on that misrepresentation, and
the plaintiffs’ reasonable reliance on the misrepresentation
will also be difficult in all but the most extreme cases.
Prior to the Federal Circuit’s decision in St. Bernard
Parish, it seems that these taking claims may offer an end
run around the significant obstacles confronting prospective plaintiffs. However, the decision as it stands and if it
stands, does pose a significant bar to takings claims for
failure to adapt either through inaction or affirmative measures. On one hand, the decision creates what I think of as
a bright-line rule that the failure to take action to adjust to
climate change impacts cannot be construed as a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment.
Thus, governments that are aware of increased risk of
floods or complete inundation or other impacts but do
nothing to decrease the risk they pose to residents and their
property won’t be required to compensate those who temporarily or impermanently lose their land. On the other
hand, the case articulates a causation analysis that John
went through in some detail for government action that
may be difficult to satisfy in climate-related cases.
There are a wide range of cases that might be brought
involving sea-level rise, floods, maybe even wildfire claims.
I’m not going to run through a hypothetical analysis of
them. But the burden of showing the alternate outcome in
the absence of the government actions taken in relation to
a given risk or harm, and showing that things would have
been better under that alternate scenario, will prove difficult and without question involve a great deal of complexity in every case.
I want to look briefly at a few examples of ongoing
or recent climate change litigation that may help flesh
out some of the importance of this case. First, in Juliana v. United States,28 a coalition of youth plaintiffs had
sued the federal government alleging that a wide range of
government activities, including air pollution standards
and permits and permitting and leasing of public lands
for fossil fuel development, constitute a violation of their
substantive due process rights and of the government’s
public trust obligations. Tucked into the complaint is
something about a prospective claim that continued
actions along the business-as-usual trajectory “will effect
a complete taking of some of Plaintiffs’ property interests
by virtue of the sea level rise that is an incident of Defendants’ unlawful action.”29
This is, or maybe it would be if it were a fully stated
claim, a far different type of case than St. Bernard Parish,
which focuses on management of water infrastructure,
not federal environmental energy and natural resources
policy. But I think it provides a useful and perhaps entertaining example. First, the claim, if it were to be fully litigated, would not ostensibly be precluded by the inaction
bar, as it focuses on affirmative measures undertaken by
the government rather than inaction. Second, plaintiffs
28. 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (2016).
29. Complaint at 287, Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (2016)
(No. 6:15-CV-01517-TC).
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would have to show that but for the U.S. government’s
actions, sea-level rise would be less and the impacts on
the plaintiffs’ individual property would be less than it
is or will be.
This would be a tough point to make as it involves
global climate modeling and scenario analysis, along with
downscaled projections of localized climate impacts that
adequately prove things would have been discernibly different had the United States not pursued its existing energy,
environmental, and resources management strategies. As it
stands, the particular claim is not the focus of continued
litigation in Juliana. And I don’t expect that that will play
out in detail in that case.
In Illinois Farmers Insurance,30 the Illinois Farmers Insurance Company and Farmers Insurance Exchange and their
subsidiaries and related entities sued the Water Reclamation District for Greater Chicago, Cook County, the city
of Chicago, and numerous other cities, towns, and villages
in Illinois in a class action alleging that the municipalities’ failure to implement reasonable stormwater management practices and increased stormwater capacity resulted
in increased payouts to the plaintiffs’ insurance after heavy
rains in April 2013.
The rains resulted in sewer water flooding the insured
properties. And plaintiffs alleged that the rainfall was
within the anticipated 100-year storm, or alternatively that
it was within the climate change-adjusted 100-year rainfall return frequency based on the city of Chicago’s own
climate action plan. They asserted claims of negligence,
maintenance liability, failure to remedy known dangerous
conditions, and takings without just compensation. The
case was withdrawn, so we won’t know how it would have
turned out and exactly how this new precedent would have
played in. But certainly it would pertain to the ability of
the plaintiffs to prove their takings case in any event.
The Burgess31 case is somewhat directly analogous
except that it is set outside the United States. The plaintiffs
in that case are seeking compensation based on negligence
rather than takings. There, Ontario’s Ministry of Natural
Resources manages the water levels in several lakes whose
services would otherwise rise higher and fall lower with
snowmelt and precipitation. Historically, the area around
the lakes has not seen flooding, but since 2010, three different floods have damaged and destroyed private property there.
In September 2016, property owners filed a class action
suit seeking $900 million Canadian in damages from the
ministry for the most recent flood events. The plaintiffs
alleged that the ministry had a duty to avert foreseeable
flooding, knew that the lakes had reached dangerously
high levels, yet negligently allowed the lakes to flood,
which in turn destroyed adjacent structures.

30. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District
of Greater Chicago, No. 1:14-cv-03251 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2014).
31. Burgess v. Ontario Minister of Natural Resources and Forestry, [2016] No.
16-1325 CP (Can.).
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This case highlights the two points of a takings claim
made along similar lines in a similar factual scenario we’d
have to make in the United States. First, that the flooding
was due to actions by the government rather than the failure to take some sort of action, and second, that the flooding was worse than it would have been if the government
was not managing the water levels at all.
Turning now to what I framed as cases with related but
distinct issues: the Cangemi case.32 In that case, the federal jury found in favor of property owners on Montauk
out on Long Island under intentional private nuisance and
trespass claims against the town of East Hampton. The
plaintiffs alleged that jetties in the harbor owned by the
town have caused erosion on the shoreline of their properties, and in many cases have entirely stripped the properties
of beach frontage, leaving them more vulnerable to storm
damage associated with climate change.
The town has appealed this decision. In its appeal, it
raised arguments that are notable in this context. First,
they argued that no reasonable jury could find, based on
the evidence that was submitted, that the jetties were the
proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ damages or that the jetties interfered with the plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of
their properties. The town also argued that the plaintiffs’
expert could not isolate interference by the jetties from
other factors that caused erosion on the shoreline, and that
the expert acknowledged that sea-level rise was among a
number of factors causing erosion but did not include sealevel rise in the expert presentation. These types of factspecific debates will dominate future battles over proving
causation whether in a negligence or a takings context.
Finally, in Harris County Flood Control District v. Kerr,33
plaintiffs consisted of about 400 homeowners whose homes
suffered flood damage one or more times due to Tropical
Storms Frances in 1998, Allison in 2001, and another
storm in 2002. A summary of the Supreme Court of Texas’
decision in the case is as follows:
This long-running dispute poses a question of constitutional law: whether governmental entities that engage in
flood-control efforts are liable to homeowners who suffer
flood damage, on the theory that the governments effected
a taking of the homeowners’ property by approving private development without fully implementing a previously
approved flood-control plan. Under the circumstances
presented, we answer no.34

Finally, I want to address the question of where this
all leaves would-be plaintiffs seeking to force government
adaptation. Departing from the takings context, I want
to note a few potential strategies. The Conservation Law
Foundation has filed two different lawsuits against fossil
fuel companies in New England, arguing that their stormwater and hazardous waste management plans are not
32. Cangemi v. Town of East Hampton, No. 2:12-cv-03989 (E.D.N.Y. July 30,
2018).
33. No. 13-0303 (Tex. 2016).
34. Id.
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adequate to protect against releases given the current level
of storm-related risks.35 The lawsuits also originally complained of future risks related to climate change. But at
least in one of those cases, the time window that the judge
is allowing the parties to argue has been foreshortened.
These suits could provide a model for similar lawsuits
under the Clean Water Act36 and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,37 seeking to force governments
and private actors to update their preparedness for climaterelated impacts to a wide range of coastal infrastructure.
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)38 and
the “little NEPAs,” or the state equivalents to NEPA, also
provide an opportunity for the public to seek to force the
government and project sponsors undergoing project review
to analyze and disclose the risks that climate change poses
to proposed projects, as well as the ways in which projects
might contribute to climate change. Similarly, the public
can seek to encourage and perhaps force utility regulators
to require climate hazard assessment in a range of different
ratemaking and other types of proceedings.
Finally, the National Flood Insurance Program is clearly
in need of significant reform.
Teresa Chan: We’re going to move now to questions. I’m
going to start things off by asking our panelists if they
want to respond to something that they heard in one of the
other panelists’ talks or if one of the other talks sparked an
idea that they didn’t have a chance to address yet.
John Echeverria: One of the things that struck me about
the St. Bernard Parish litigation is the fact that, whichever
way you slice it, the U.S. taxpayer is the loser. I understand that the Corps built the project, but it was built at
the behest of political leaders in Louisiana who thought it
was a good idea, even if at great expense to the American
taxpayer. I think everyone who is familiar with the political process for organizing and getting a Corps project built
understands that these are driven by local political forces.
In addition, so far as I know, no one ever really thought
that the MRGO project was a sensible or useful project
to serve navigation interests. Now that this boondoogle
project has allegedly caused flooding damage, Louisianans
have turned around and tried to sock the U.S. taxpayer
again for the injuries caused by this project paid for with
U.S. taxpayer dollars. I think this is one of the most painful
lessons in the whole story surrounding the MRGO project.
Vincent Colatriano: I’d like to address that. I’m not
familiar with the entire history of the political background
of the MRGO project, but I do think you’re painting
with a little bit of a broad brush when you say that it was
politically supported throughout Louisiana. From the very
35. Conservation Law Foundation, Inc. v. Shell Oil Products US, No. 1:17cv-00396 (D.R.I. Aug. 28, 2017); Conservation Law Foundation v.
ExxonMobil Corp., No. 1:16-cv-11950 (D. Mass. Sept. 29, 2016).
36. 33 U.S.C. §§1251-1387, ELR Stat. FWPCA §§101-607.
37. 42 U.S.C. §§6901-6992k, ELR Stat. RCRA §§1001-11011.
38. 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4370h, ELR Stat. NEPA §§2-209.
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beginning, there were communities, including St. Bernard
Parish, that were raising warnings about the effects that the
MRGO would have in St. Bernard Parish.
I mentioned the 1957 warning that came from I
think a St. Bernard Parish Council—I’m not sure if it
was a government body but it was at least a citizens’
council—saying that the MRGO is going to create a
flood risk. So, there were at least many citizens and taxpayers who were not clamoring for this project and were
in fact clamoring against it. I do think that needs to be
mentioned here, although I’m not sure to what extent it
bears on the legal analysis.
Switching gears, I do want to make a point about inaction. The Federal Circuit announced a pretty categorical
rule: that inaction can never amount to a taking. I’m not
sure that that is completely consistent with Arkansas Game
in which the Supreme Court said these types of categorical
or blanket rules are disfavored.
But even leaving that issue aside, I think there’s a real
problem characterizing this case as one that involves “inaction.” The claim here was predicated on affirmative action,
the construction of the MRGO, which created a flood risk.
It is true that the Corps then failed to mitigate the effects
of its affirmative action. I don’t think that in any sense can
be fairly characterized as government “inaction.” It is just
that the government decided as a matter of policy that it
wasn’t going to address the effects of its earlier action. I
think to claim that that is “inaction” that is immune from
Takings Clause liability really does set a precedent that is
quite troublesome.
Teresa Chan: That actually brings up the question whether
there is potentially a fuzzy line between action and inaction in a takings case.
John Echeverria: I think it’s a pretty clear line. I think it’s a
pretty manageable line. I guess my concern is the full scope
of government liability that might be opened up once you
talk about inaction. The government builds a seawall that
looked good enough for the time. But the claim is, well,
they should have built it higher and stronger. Their failure
to upgrade the seawall becomes a basis for liability.
Michael Burger: I think it is a bit fuzzy. I think that we’ll
probably see some future litigation that will wind up defining more clearly what the lines are. The seawall example is
a great one. You could even look at a situation where there’s
no seawall, but there is a risk of sea-level rise. So there,
the decision not to build the seawall at all would be inaction and sensibly would be barred by this precedent. That
will be quite clear. But the decision to permit some other
development that falls into the area that is exposed to risks
from sea-level rise in the area where they’re not building a
seawall would be government inaction.
I think a lot of it will depend on how the lawyers frame
it. Obviously, the litigators will seek to frame things as
involving government action rather than government
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inaction. Judges will be asked to determine which bucket
things fall into. I think that we’ll see this develop a bit
more over the next few years.
John Echeverria: There’s a larger concern I have about this
whole suite of climate litigation. It’s that the projections of
property damage over the next 50 or 100 years from sealevel rise are just jaw-dropping in their magnitude. I think
the question is how does society deal with those damages.
And is it sensible to go after local governments for failure to
anticipate and deal with, mitigate, and divert the impacts
of sea-level rise, when in fact the major responsibility by
any sensible measure in the vast majority of cases—setting
aside the dispute we’re having about the MRGO—falls on
corporate actors and government at the national level?
The idea that some poor local community along the
New Jersey Shore should be saddled with liability for failing to stick a finger in an eroding dike when they had so
little responsibility for causing the global problem seems
kind of lacking in common sense to me. Somehow the
legal effort seems misdirected when it’s aimed at these poor
local communities that are on the front edge of climate
impacts and are going to be suffering the worst impacts.
The governments themselves are going to be suffering significant losses. They’re going to be suffering an erosion of
their tax bases, and are going to be the least capable going
forward of providing compensation for those who claim
injuries as a result of sea-level rise.
Teresa Chan: John, you bring up a really interesting
point, which is who will pay for damages if people are
going to be looking in the coming years to cover their
damages as we see more extreme weather. I’m wondering,
Vince or Mike, if you want to weigh in as to where you
think that liability lies.
Michael Burger: I think that we’re seeing a variety of
attempts to figure that out in the courts. Obviously at the
largest scale, at the global scale, there have been negotiations for a quarter of a century over who bears responsibility, and where the financing should come from in order to
deal with loss and damage for the most vulnerable nations
and those that are least well-prepared to deal with the economic realities of adapting to climate change while at the
same time being the least responsible for climate change.
So, there’s sort of that bucket where this is playing out.
Then, there are the lawsuits that I referenced where we
have Rhode Island, New York City, Baltimore, Boulder
County, eight different local governments across California, and King County up in Washington. I think that
I’ve touched on all of the ones that have been filed to date
against the so-called carbon majors. There’s a number of
different defendants who have been named in those cases,
but you can think of the five biggest ones as the most common defendants in those cases. Those are along the lines
that John was suggesting, where the claim is being made
that these particular companies bear a significant burden
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and a degree of responsibility for climate change, and that
they should be contributing directly to local governments’
adaptation costs.
To date, we have seen two of those cases dismissed at the
trial court level, one in the Northern District of California
and one in the Southern District of New York.39 Both of
those cases are going to move forward on appeal. The decisions in those cases are not binding on the jurisdictions
hearing the other cases, at either the state or the federal
level. So, I think basically the question of whether these
companies should and can bear the liability in a litigation
context or in a court-based context will play out over the
next 12 months as we see more and more of these decisions
come down.
Teresa Chan: This brings up another question as to
whether litigation is the right avenue for trying to get governments to act. Mike, you’ve talked about the other cases
we’re seeing out there. Is this the appropriate avenue or are
there better avenues to get governments to act in the face
of climate change?
Michael Burger: My own view on that is that we’re in an
all-hands-on-deck situation and a by-any-means-necessary
kind of situation. I think we’ve seen an increase in these
kinds of cases, these more novel theories coming forward.
Certainly, the city lawsuits, the municipal lawsuits against
the fossil fuel companies, in my view express a degree of
frustration with the rollbacks on climate policy that we’re
seeing at the federal level and the abdication of leadership
and responsibility at the federal level.
In a situation where the federal government is fundamentally failing to take action on climate change, we’re
left with state and local governments and private actors to
demonstrate leadership. We are seeing that, but we’re also
seeing that we’re still falling well short on both mitigation
and adaptation, the levels of ambition on both fronts that
we need. So, I think the court cases are inevitable, if not a
necessary complement to those other political, regulatory,
and other efforts.
John Echeverria: I think there’s an interesting parallel
between the current situation and Superfund. The country
recognized that we had legacy toxic waste sites, some of
which had been abandoned and were completely orphaned
sites, and others that had some identifiable culprits who
had contributed to the problem. But this whole collection of waste sites is recognized as a national problem. A
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national effort was mounted to clean up the sites. A whole
liability regime was put in place to try to assign liability on
a retroactive basis to those who were responsible for creating the situation.
It seems to me that the current situation cries out for
national leadership. Elected officials have not moved on
this idea because in the current political environment it’s
such a nonstarter. But in a sensible world, if we might eventually live again in a sensible world, Congress would take
leadership on this and would formulate policies on resettlement of communities and populations that are threatened
with sea-level rise; define and try to cover the enormous
costs that are going to be associated with sea-level rise; and
set up a legal regime that would assign liability in sensible
and comprehensive ways. But short of that kind of national
leadership, I’m very pessimistic about the ability of litigation involving individual landowners against particular
communities to make much of a dent in this problem. And
I see even less hope at the international level.
Teresa Chan: Any final thoughts?
Vincent Colatriano: Thanks for this opportunity, and
thanks to my co-panelists for this very interesting discussion. I don’t have a background in public policy relating to
climate change or the broader scope of climate change litigation writ large. But I do think there is a role for litigation
in certain narrow circumstances. We have a Fifth Amendment that protects property from government seizure and
from government invasions. I think, in those discrete circumstances where it can be proven that the government
has been responsible for a destructive invasion of property,
the Fifth Amendment is there for a reason. I think it could
provide a useful check on government action.
John Echeverria: I’m going to be looking forward to the
cert petition in this case, to see how the challenge is framed
to the Federal Circuit’s ruling on inaction.
Michael Burger: The one thing that I would underscore is
that litigation has an important role to play in adaptation.
When I say that, I’m not limiting it to the Fifth Amendment and to takings cases or to the common-law cases, but
also to statutory modes of causes of action in using existing environmental, energy, and resources statutes to force
government to assess climate risks and then take action to
adapt to the risks in order to avoid the secondary environmental impacts that would result in failing to do so.

